The saturation of capacity in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) has prompted a massive investment in the development of a modernized Air Traffic Control (ATC) system known as NextGen. The return on this investment is predicated on the availability of increased capacity where and when it is needed by the continuously evolving airline route system. The objective of this research is to develop policies for the design and development of NextGen that avoids under-utilization of ATC infrastructure in the presence of adaptive airline strategies. This paper describes a multi-agent simulation of airline route selection strategies for alternate trans-continental routes. The analysis shows the existence of a natural equilibrium that identifies a trade-off between ATC infrastructure utilization with airline operating costs over a range of alternate route distance, airline cost structures, and airline strategies. The implications of these results for NextGen planning and policy are discussed.
Introduction
The saturation of capacity in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) has prompted massive investment in the design and development of a modernized Air Traffic Control system known as NextGen. The return on this investment is determined by the availability of capacity in the geographic locations and in the time-frames required by the airline route structures to support the air transportation demand generated by the national economy.
Infrastructure modernization efforts, requiring long lead-times and large capital investments, are subject to problems of "too-little-too-late" or of "gross underutilization" [1] . Researchers have taken two approaches to studying this problem. First researchers have assumed that stakeholders act as "rational agents" [2] and seek to maximize their individual gains. One form of the outcome of this analysis is known as the Nash Equilibrium as defined by Game Theory. In this representation of the problem, none of the agents voluntarily change their strategy until they are incentivized appropriately.
Researchers have shown that in some "games" stakeholders can perform better than the Nash Equilibrium if the agents share information [3, 4, 5] . Proposed NextGen technologies will provide more real-time information to the stakeholders that could lead to adaptive airline strategies. These strategies could lead to temporal over-scheduling or under-utilization of ATC infrastructure [6] .
The main results of the analysis are:
 Airline strategies determine the utilization of alternate ATC infrastructure (e.g. alternate trans-continental routes).
 Airline strategies vary with the costs of operation (and cannot be assumed fixed for the design of airspace and procedures).
 In several cost/distance scenarios, airlines will naturally choose an equilibrium that is a balance between First-Come/First-Serve and Preferred Routing.
The analysis shows the existence of a natural equilibrium that identifies the trade-off between ATC infrastructure utilization with airline operating costs over a range of alternate route distance, airline cost structures, and airline strategies. Further, the paper demonstrates that strategies other than the current first come-first served (FCFS) can improve the utilization of the system, keep the cost low, and give more flexibility to the airlines and aircraft. The implications of these results for NextGen planning and policy are discussed.
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Problem statement and background
Flights scheduled to depart from several airports on one side of the country can choose from a set of alternate trans-continental routes to their common destination airport (or metroplex) on the other side of the country (see Figure 1) . Controllers assign flights to routes so that the traffic is balanced among routes, in a first come-first served discipline. Airlines select routes to minimize operating costs.
The routes are divided into slots to model the safety rules (separation distances). Usually, aircraft wait on the ground until the controllers allow them to fly just-in-time to enter an available slot in a route. Delays on the ground imply wait times and costs for passengers and airlines. Delays can be modeled by departure queues. Once an aircraft enters a route, it flies at constant speed to maintain separation distances with the other aircraft flying the same route.
Flights push back from the gates with a push back delay that is exponentially distributed. Each route has its own entry queue (or wait) associated. The queues are also divided into slots, time slots. The entry queue is virtually located before the socalled virtual entry fix which is the point in which all the aircraft enter the route (see Figure 1 ). The number of slots from the entry fix to the destination is called the route distance. In this study, all slots are either 5 minutes (for time slots) or 25 nm (for distance slots). A constant speed of 300 knots is assumed so that it takes 5 minutes to fly 25 nm.
When more resources or information are available, as it is proposed by NextGen (SEVEN, SWIM [7] ) the airlines or the flight crews themselves could choose routes to maximize their objective functions.
Airline Strategies
The strategy of a flight agent is modeled by the following equation:
Where r i is the i-th route, φ is the control variable (parameter) so that β ≤ φ ≤ α, d(x) is the distance of route x, q(x) is the length of the entry queue for the route x, c f is the cost of flying a distance slot, c w is the cost of waiting a time slot.
The policy of an airline is modeled by two parameters, β and α. The conditions on these parameters are 0 ≤ β < α ≤ 1. Any combination of policies can be simulated by changing the value of these parameters for each airline.
A flight can use any value of φ that the policy allows. This allows several strategies for the route selection by varying φ. Setting φ = 0 obtains the first come-first served strategy, i.e. the flight decides based on the length of the waiting queue. Other examples are φ = 1, i.e. the flight decides based on the route distance, and φ = 0.5, i.e. give the same relevance to the length of the waiting in queue and the distance of the route. Also, setting β The aircraft are rational agents [2] . The agents decide based on local information only: no systemwide, historic or future information is considered to decide.
Methodology
These experiments are simulated using the MASON discrete event multi-agent simulation platform [8] 1 . MASON is a free, open-source, Java library designed and implemented at George Mason University.
Each airline agent in the model defines the policy for its flights. Each flight agent defines its weights, in the moment of its creation, by asking the airline what is the current policy and choosing randomly from the ranges of that policy. There are 90 flight agents because each airline has a schedule with 30 flights. Only flat schedules are used in this study: there is only one aircraft per time slot, and there are no gaps in the schedules, i.e. flights are all consecutive. The task of the flight agents during the simulation is to decide which route to take. After that, route agents handle the flight agents. Route agents have several tasks. First, route agents receive new flights in the route. Second, they model the motion of the flights in the route. Third, they take out of the route flights that reach their destination, i.e. the end of the route. Fourth, each route agent contains a waiting (entry) queues and move flights in and out of the queue -and into the route-. There are other agents to gather statistics and to store data into a database for further analysis.
Experimental design
This study consists of five experiments, one for each value of φ -strategy-from the set {0.0, 0.33, 0.5, 0.67, 1.0}. There are two routes in each experiment, one of them with fixed distance of 57 slots. The other route varies its distance from 39 to 75 slots in 2 slots steps, to have 19 distance ratios in total. Three wait to fly cost ratios are also used in each experiment: 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7. So, each experiment has 57 scenarios, one for each 1 See http://cs.gmu.edu/~eclab/projects/mason/ for more information. combination of route distance and wait/fly cost ratios. Each scenario is repeated 30 times (Monte Carlo simulation) to account for the stochastic nature of the simulation. Each repetition of a scenario runs for 100 time steps.
Results and discussion
The effects of airline strategies (i.e. adjusting φ) for alternate airline cost structure on alternate routes are discussed below for route utilization and then aggregated airline cost. Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the number of unused route slots for three different wait/fly cost ratios. In all the cases the results are for three airlines, two routes, and average push back delay of 25 minutes (exponentially distributed), and the distance ratio varied from 0.68 to 1.32. Also the φ parameter varied in several steps from 0 to 1. All the values shown in the image are averages taken over 30 executions of the same scenario. One standard deviation above and below the mean value is also shown by vertical error lines. The Y-axis is the number of unused route slots in the end of the execution of a scenario (average values over the 30 executions). The X-axis is the route distance ratio. Each line in the charts represents the results for a particular value of φ (φ = 0 means FCFS, φ = 1 means choosing shortest route). In all these charts, the right side is almost an exact mirror image of the But of these other variables only the wait/fly ratio will be explored in this study.
Route utilization
The best utilization is achieved when φ = 0. So, choosing routes based only on route distance is the best a flight or a controller can do if the goal is to optimize utilization only.
When the route distance ratio approaches 1, the number of unused slots approaches 0, but the standard deviation increases. In that point, all values of φ make the system behave the same way, i.e. all strategies are equivalent. Strategies show their differences as the distance ratio moves away from 1. Lower values of φ result in less unused route slots than higher values do. But the differences in the number of unused slots are not linear on φ. Figure 2 . The reduction in unused slots is significant, it in some cases it approaches 40%. Increasing the wait/fly ratio makes the agents use the resources better. Figure 4 shows the results for a wait/fly ratio is 0.7. When φ = 0.00 and φ = 1.00 the behavior of the system in terms of unused route slots is the same as it was in the two previous cases. But the rest of the values show reductions in the number of unused route slots even when compared to the values for a wait/fly ratio of 0.5 ( Figure 3) . However, the reduction is smaller than it was when the wait/fly ratio when from 0.3 to 0.5.
The figures above show that, in terms of route utilization, the effect of the strategies used by the flights is more evident as the distance ratio moves away from 1. When the distance ratio is 1, there is no difference between strategies. The best strategy is to select the shortest wait queue (φ = 0.0) regardless of any other variable or parameter. If the wait/fly ratio increases, the strategies even improve the utilization. Figure 5 is the result that complements the utilization shown in Figure 2 . The figure shows that the variables controlling the utilization also control the aggregated airline cost. In general, if the distance ratio is close to 1, choosing a lower value of φ will reduce the cost in general. When the distance ratio deviates too much from 1.0, then higher values of φ reduce the costs better than lower values.
Aggregated airline cost
When the distance ratio is 1, all the strategies behave the same way, i.e. in that case any strategy can be used. Figure 6 shows the results that complement the utilization shown in Figure 3 . The comparison between Figure 5 and Figure 6 shows that when the wait/fly ratio increases the effect of φ is accentuated; higher values of φ increase the aggregated airline costs with respect to lower values of φ, and the relative differences between the behaviors become bigger. It is not observed anymore in the figure if there is a crossing of the lines when the distance ratio moves away from 1. But again, when the distance ratio is 1, there is no difference between strategies. Figure 7 shows that increasing the wait/fly ratio accentuates the difference between strategies; the lines separate even more from each other in this case. However, all the strategies behave the same way when the distance ratio is 1.0.
Summarizing, from the aggregated airline cost point of view, choosing lower values of φ reduces the cost when compared to the higher values of φ. An exception is when the wait/fly ratio is low and the distance ratio deviates too much from 1. In this case, using higher values of φ achieves lower aggregated costs. Increases in the wait/fly ratio only accentuate the differences between strategies, but still lower values of φ achieve, in general, lower aggregated airline costs. 
Conclusions and future work
In system where all the flights simultaneously use the same strategy, controlling the aggregated airlines cost and the route utilization of the system takes a combination of several variables: the strategy of the flights (determined by the φ parameter), the wait/fly ratio, and the route distance ratio. The wait/fly ratio is usually given: it is a characteristic of the system. Then, in fact, only two variables can really be used to make decisions in a system like this.
From the utilization point of view, the strategy that results in less unused route slots is to choose routes based on the shortest wait queue (φ = 0.0). This is true even when the distances of the routes differ significantly. Only when the distance ratio is 1.0 there is no difference between strategies.
From the point of view of aggregated airline cost, the best strategy uses lower φ values. There is an exception when wait/fly ratio is low and distance ratio deviates too much from 1.0. In this particular case it is better to use higher values of φ for the flights. An increase in the wait/fly ratio only accentuates the difference between strategies. But it does not change the fact that, in general, using lower values of φ achieves lower costs than higher values of φ.
The contribution of this paper is the conclusion that FCFS strategy (φ = 0.0) is usually efficient when assigning routes to flights. However, there are some exceptions when the wait/fly ratio is low and the distance ratio significantly differs from 1. In those exceptional cases, the efficiency will be higher using higher values for φ. Pilots and controllers should be aware of these exceptions so that they can help achieve higher performance when these exceptional conditions occur.
Future work includes creating adaptable agents that seek improvements of global utilization and aggregated airline costs. The current implementation uses evolutionary algorithms to achieve this adaptation. With these methods, the limitation of using the same strategy for all the flights is not needed.
